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Nowadays, pretentions claiming to have a privileged access to reality and to 
provide the right solution to the numerous complex questions that we are faced 
with –are very common.  We consider those pretensions to be too ambitious and 
flawed, thus preferring to adopt an "epistemological democratic" standpoint.1 This 
means that we have to promote a wide debate in order to include the greatest 
number of positions and to gather the best aspects from each one in order to build 
appropriate answers to those questions.2 Several social theorists, including K. 
Popper and J. Habermas, would agree on this assumption too.  
 As Habermas (1987, 1989) points out, a change in modern moral 
consciousness has overcome the Kantian straight separation between the fields of 
law, morals, politics etc.,  that  now  (re-)articulate  on another level, without losing 
their autonomy . This new consciousness differentiates norms, justificatory 
principles and procedures to (self-) regulate and (self-) control their adequacy to 
each other. So the legitimacy of law depends most of all on the procedures, as far 
as their outcomes conform to one of the possible contents of the principles and 
norms, to be compatible with basic values such as rationality, democratic 
participation, pluralism, economic efficiency. Such values are already pursued in 
the design of those procedures3. At this point, we should mention, with emphasis, 
the sayings of the Frankfurtian legal philosopher R. Wiethölter (1989) according to 
whom in post-industrial society we find the most distinctive feature of law to be its 
"proceduralization" (Prozeduralisierung).4 If we accept this view,   it would mean that 
M. Weber's thesis defending that law in modern society was essentially formal, due 
to the prevalence of general and abstract norms opposed to more substantive ones 
in pre-modern societies - is no longer adequate to describe law in today’s 
postmodern society. Nowadays, the major problem is not the protection of 
individual liberty against arbitrary action of the State, but the enforcement of 
collective interest by the State and social agencies. In attaining those collective 
interests, there are also public and individual interests to be respected, but to 
assure that respect thoroughly by general and abstract statutes in advance is very 
hard, if not impossible. -. There must be a case-by-case, contextualized 
consideration. Therefore, the best we can do is to ensure fair procedures, in order 
to achieve decisions that are shaped to consider all conflicting interests and/or 
                    ___________________________ 
1 What I wish to stress here is the fact that in postmodern society there is a plurality of equally valid 
descriptions of  it - and prescriptions based on them -, which to a certain degree can be combined 
to give a more adequate - by being more comprehensive - solution to social problems. (In this 
sense, Luhmann,   1991: 44, 55 et seq., and Habermas defend that, nowadays, there is a development 
and improvement of the modernity calling this phase "middle modernity”. In fact, they call “middle 
modernity” to what I consider to be the end of it. 
2 What is meant here is not the "end of ideology", but, on the contrary, the assumption of a new 
type of ideology, a (self-) consciously assumed ideology, opened to include assumptions   of other 
ideologies. We might call this type of ideology a "super-ideology" and correlate it, for instance,   
with what I called in a previous essay “inclusive theories" in legal epistemology. (See Guerra Fo., 
1989.) 
3 (See further R. Alexy, 1987; E. Denninger, 1989: 481; R. Dworkin, 1978: 22 ff., passim, 1985: 72 
ff.; J. E. Faria, 1991: 143 ff.; Gomes Canotilho, 1990; W. Guerra Filho, 1991: 195, 1992; Ch. 
Joerges, 1989: 627 ff.; Luhmann, 1990: 192; Rawls, 1972: 197; Teubner, 1984: 109 ff.; and the 
special issue on "procedural justice" of Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie, 1993.)  
4 See here what Roberto M. Unger (1976: 192 ff.) states for the "Postliberal Societies". Notice also 
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values.5 The concept of “proceduralization” is congenial to Luhmann's thesis on 
“legitimacy through procedure” and might very well be understood as a “call to 
judicial responsibility” (Drucilla Cornell, 1992). "The Court, competent because of 
its expertise, or the highly specialized administrative body, comes to a policy 
decision only after a thorough discussion of possible consequences with 
representatives of the interests concerned" (Kübler, 1987: 234). This occurs mainly 
through "balancing" (Abwägung) these interests and/or values according to a 
"principle of proportionality" (Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit).(6) As Wiethölter 
(1986: 66) explains, "[i]n the fundamental legal principle of proportionality I have 
sought to define the most influential machinery of transformation for the osmosis, 
translation, and covariance of law and society, as the supreme and most general 
productive principle of an - admittedly silent, and absolutely unavoidable - 
justification of conflict rules for the decision of conflicting rights, interests and 
needs".(7) 
The legal system functions with its own (binary) code, that is to say, in the 
determination of what is legal viz. right (Recht) or illegal viz. wrong (Unrecht), so 
that there is no need to import criteria from other systems, although those are 
connected with the legal system by means of procedures of many sorts - legislative, 
administrative, contractual and judicial -, which are essential to the system's 
operations of juridical self-reproduction (= "operational closeness", operative 
Geschlossenheit).(8) The autonomy of the system is a condition for the possibility of 
its connection with other systems, that is to say, for its "openness" (Offenheit). (See 
Luhmann, 1987: 603 ff.; Neves, 1992: 36 et seq.) 
                    ___________________________ 
5 Nowadays, those procedures have to be shaped anew in order to adjust to collective demands 
presented by social movements, which are so organized that we can speak of them as being a 
"collective subject" (Souza Jr., 1991: 131 ff. See further Rojas Hurtado, 1992; Paoli, 1992, and, for a 
support from the autopoietical theory of law, Teubner, 1989). 
6 See, v.g., R. Alexy, op. cit. In the self-definied as post-modern legal theory of K.-H. Ladeur (1983, 
198 5) the Abwägung is considered as the most distinctive characteristic of legal paradigma 
nowadays, since it permits to bring the (individual) solution that each (individual) case deserves. M. 
Neves (1992: 43) accurately observes that "in der paradoxen Perspektive des Postmodernismus ist 
das allgemeine Paradigma (die Abwägung) die Negation von allgemeinen Paradigmen". But Ladeur 
follows here one of Luhmann's main course of action: the willingness to generate paradoxes to 
make a theoretical creative use of them, by transforming them in tautologies, in order to make our  
representation  of  the  already  (hyper-)complex reality we are faced with  even more complex . 
(See Luhmann, 1986: 15 ff., 1987', 1988', 1990': 716, and, for the paradoxal viz. antinomic nature of 
self-referential systems, Varela, 1975.) 
7 This is not the place to develop, in its whole extension, the theoretical features of this principle. A 
previous study (Guerra Fo., 1989') has shown, for example, that it might be seen as a "principle of 
principles", since it can equate the problem of conflicting principles in a concrete (hard) case. This 
means that it can make a "hierarchical loop", i.e. from the highest point in the legal order's 
"pyramid" it can go to its very bottom and be used to validate different (judicial, administrative etc.) 
decisions in different situations according to the same set of rules, thus implementing the circular 
and "topical" kind of legal validation that is needed in today's hyper-complex societies. Last but not 
least, as Broekman (1992: 178 et seq., passim) asserts, "proportionality", "balancing", equilibrium is 
congenial to the (legal) understanding of justice and the necessary   counterpart of a "poetic 
justice", to attain the "beauté géométrique" of a "juristic art" (Commaille, 1992: 35). 
8 As G. Teubner (1987: 20) exemplarily formulates, "[t]he more the legal systems specializes in its 
function of creating expectations by conflicting regulation, the more it develops and refines norms 
and procedures, which can be used for future oriented behaviour control. This can only be 
formulated in the following paradoxical terms: Law, by being posited as autonomous in its function - 
formality - becomes increasingly dependent on the demands for performance from its social environment - materiality". 
(Emphasis as in the original) Proceduralization, toone’s view, represents the way out of the 
aporetical conflict between the modern feature of formality and the pre-modern materiality of law 
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 In the maintenance of the legal system's autonomy, the judiciary is above all 
supported by a "cognizing unit" called legal doctrine.9  This unit is absolutely 
necessary to the autopoiesis of social systems, since it is responsible for its self-
observation (that is, for instance, what makes social systems differ from biological 
or chemical ones - Luhmann, 1987: 64) and for the recognition of the elements 
that are from this specific system - and not from another one, placed in its 
environment (see Luhmann, 1987: 60 ss.): "Auch die Beschreibung des Rechts 
muß noch rechtliche brauchbar sein" (Id., 1988: 13). Critical theories contribute to 
improve and enhance this process of the system's reflexive self-observation, thus 
contributing to its operational closure. (See Id., 1991: 277.) The same happens with 
jusnaturalistic and axiological theories, which do not have to be rejected by the 
(autopoietical) systems theory, but rather included in its more comprehensive 
theoretical framework.10 (See Id., 1988: 15 et seq.) 
 Legal theory not only improves the interpretative apparatus used by judicature, 
but it also furnishes interpretations that can possibly be adopted by judges, and by 
doing so helps them to fulfill their fundamental task of defining the conflicts and 
solutions that are to be seen in accordance to the law, by modelling a specific 
juridical perception of social reality.11 "These perceptions differ significantly from 
our day-to-day understanding of these phenomena as well as from sociological or 
economic theories. The legal system develops certain specific social constructions 
of reality (Berger and Luckmann) in order to decide social conflicts under the 
guidance of legal norms. In creating its own reality from the perspective imposed 
by the exigencies of conflict resolution, the legal system disregards highly selective 
models of the world, thereby neglecting many politically, economically, and 
socially relevant elements" (Teubner, 1983: 279).(12)   
 The legal system appears as one of the "functional systems" of the social 
system as an all with the task of reducing the complexity of the environment 
engrossing the entirety of social behavior, by guaranteeing a certain congruence 
between the expectations of how the individuals are going to behave themselves, 
and the generalization of these expectations, by being immune to the danger of 
                    ___________________________ 
9 Perhaps because he was aware of this state-of-affairs,E. L. Rubin (1988) advances his thesis of the 
"unity of discourse" between judicature and legal scholarship. 
10 Here we must remind that the conception of "society as a system" is considered by Trubek 
(1990: 5) as "a major advance in legal thought" brought to North-America by the law and society 
movement, what makes it congenial also to the critical tradition. 
11 The "alternative use of law" by the Magistratura Democratica in Italy and the more recent 
"Alternative Law Movement" in Brazil are examples of the impulse that a theoretical conception 
may give to change the legal order through a divergent interpretation by the judicature. (See Arruda 
Jr., 1993: 169 ff.; Bergalli, 1991: 17 ff.; Capeller, 1992: 370; Faria/Campilongo, 1991: 116 et. seq.) 
12 As P. Barcelona (1994: 105) points out, referring to Luhmann's theory, in a critical, but accurate 
manner, "non esistono infatti per il sistema nessi causali oggettivi, giaché è `il sistema stesso che sceglie 
criteri per risolvere i propri problemi interni', formando in tal modo `una certa interpretazione del 
reale'. Il sistema è una trama d'istituzioni che selezionano le possibilità indeterminate dell'ambiente 
e le trasformano in alternative e strategie compatibili con gli obiettivi della stabilizzazione e della 
conservazione". But here is necessary to recall that, according to Luhmann (1982: 137; 1986': 112, 
note 2), the purpose of autopoietic systems' theory is not to support the static conservation of 
society's identity, but it rather reaches to stimulate autonomy and evolution to a stage of dynamic 
stability. And as he also asserts, changes in social systems "will always require operating within, not 
against `the system'" (id. ib.: 135). In this context, might be also of interest to remind that the thesis 
of the production of reality as being a feature of the law is sustained by Edelman (1973) in a classic 
work of the French critical tradition. In the North-american critical tradition the notion of 
"discursivity" (see Trubek, 1990: 34 et seq.) could also be correlated to this. The same idea seems to 
be central in the interpretative approach from the socio-legal research (see Harrington/Yngvesson, 
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disappointing themselves.  The juridical system, for Luhmann, integrates the 
"immune system" of the societies, inoculating them from the conflicts between its 
members, already appearing in other social systems (politics, economy, family, 
etc.).  This, however, is done not by the negation of the conflicts, that is to say, 
against the conflicts, but with the conflicts, just as the living organisms immunize 
themselves against diseases caused by their germs.  Furthermore, the complexity of 
the social reality, with its extreme contingency, is reduced by the construction of a 
supra-reality, codified from the "law/no-law" binary scheme, where conflicts 
which are not conflicts for the law are foreseen and solutions that can form the 
law are offered.  (See Luhmann, 1988: 507, 509 ff.; 1972: 40 ff., 104/105). Gerhard 
Roth (1987: 414 ff.) shows that this construction of a supra-reality, the 
Wirklichkeit, of reduced complexity, above the reality itself, the Realität, is already 
done by the nervous system itself, allowing Man to make prognoses and make 
complex decisions, "so that he does not work with "raw data" but with already 
elaborated data..." (p. 415). 
      Law, then, develops itself by reacting only to its own impulses, although it 
is stimulated by "irritations" arising from the social environment.  "Even the most 
powerful pressures will only be taken into account and elaborated juridically in the 
forms that they appear in the internal "screens", where the juridic constructions of 
reality (rechtlichen Wirklichkeitskonstruktionen) are projected. In this sense, the 
great social evolutions `modulate' the evolution of the law that nevertheless, 
however, follows its own logic of development."  (Teubner, 1982: 21. See also 
id.,1983: 249.).  
In order to develop, Law, obviously, needs elements of the environment just as 
all the systems do.  The existence of a legal order regulating behaviors requires not 
only norms to regulate the legal order itself but also the behaviors that establish 
these norms. Naturally, due to the autonomous nature of this order, the behaviors 
that establish new norms are already regulated by previous ones. 
 Aware of this circumstance, present in the legal orders of contemporary 
States, Hans Kelsen, in his influential "Pure Theory of Law" (1960), introduces the 
difference between “static" and "dynamic" systems in the legal order. The “static” 
systems would have "norms regulating behaviors" and the “dynamic” ones would 
have, in return, "behaviors producing norms", observing norms that regulate them, 
(self-) regulating this normative production.  Then, the behaviors that produce 
norms, are elements of the environment, originating from another system, a 
conductive system (Handlungssystem), but that obtain objective juridic 
significance when this conductive system  refers itself to a legal norm, meaning 
that it could have resulted in another norm.  Thus, Kelsen (1960: 2) illustrates this 
scenario as follows: In a room, people are debating; some (the majority) raise their 
hands while others remain impassive, watching "from outside", this is what 
happens in a House of Representatives.  "Inside" the juridic system, however, it is 
said that Law was voted, in accordance with the established procedures of the 
Constitution, in the House of Representatives, etc, and law was then (self-) 
produced. 
      There is a   legal organization producing the elements (legal acts, legal 
norms) of its structure, by the relations that are established among them, forming 
units (the "Federal Laws" of a country, the norms of Private Law, etc.).  Thus the 
legal system is autopoietic and distinguished from the others. 
      In order for law to come to be constituted as an autopoietic system, the 
formation of fixed units was of essential importance. These fixed units can 
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theory", as Luhmann (1969: 11, note 2) points out, lies in turning the attention 
from legal theory to the study of this procedural dimension. In fact, it includes 
these norms which Herbert Hart (1961: 77 ff.) calls "secondary rules", for being 
norms that refer themselves to other norms, either to determine if a norm belongs 
to the system, when it is a "rule of recognition", or to discern how to remove or 
add a norm to the system (= "rule of change"), or even to regulate the application 
of a norm in a litigation (= "rule of adjudication"). 
 In the society, Law, with great functional differentiation among its internal 
systems, remains autonomous before the other systems - such as the moral, the 
economical, the political, the scientific ones - to the degree which it continues 
operating with its own code, and not by the criteria provided by one of the other 
systems.  At the same time, the legal system is still to achieve its structural union 
with other social systems in order to adopt others systems of different nature 
(moral, political, economic, etc…) and this can be achieved without losing its 
components. , It is necessary to recognize the one that develops the most number 
of juridical reproduction procedures: legislative procedures, administrative, judicial, 
and contractual procedures. 
      Those procedures are instituted for (self) regulation and (self) control 
on the foundation of some of the possible contents of the legal norms, so they can 
be appropriate to respond to social needs of rationality, democratic participation, 
value pluralism, economic efficiency, etc.  The juridical procedures shall be 
structured to meet these needs from the start, because, in today's most complex 
societies, it is no longer possible   for law to limit itself to being formally dedicated 
to these needs. In fact, one cannot expect that the law will completely fulfill these 
social needs. (See, v.g., Teubner, 1984: 109 ff.) We mentioned this point already, 
when examining the role of judicature in the legal system. 
 The conception of legal order as an autopoietic system does not fit the reality 
of (semi-)peripheral modern or (peripheral) traditional sectors of societies and/or 
social groups, ( e.g., Adeodato, 1991: 112) and that  is mostly because of their low 
level of social integration (Neves, 1992: 155 ss., 210; Ribeiro, 1992: 79).13 But as 
long as a legal order is not only a reality, a Sein, but it also builds an ideality, a 
Sollen, the theory of autopoietic legal systems furnishes an important knowledge 
about the possibilities of law in peripheral parts of the  global postmodern  society, 
that is to say, about how it could - and should not  be. This may lead to a critical 
(normative) use of this kind of socio-legal study (descriptive and constructivist).14  
 If, according to C. Geertz (1983: 173), "as any other trade, science, cult, or art, 
law, which is a bit of all these, propounds the world in which its descriptions make 
sense", so that it is "a distinctive manner of imaging the real", then the theory of 
autopoietic legal systems is a way of imaging this "manner of imaging the real". Its 
universalistic viz. "holistic" (in the sense of "non-redutionistic") nature can easily 
induce us to consider it as a sort of "Grand Theory" or, using R.M. Unger's terms 
(1987: 37 et seq.), a "deep-structure theory", when our point is that we would do 
better using it as a "proto-theory", i.e., "a body of ideas that can serve as a point of 
departure to different views of social reality and possibility" (id. ib.: 528).  Such a 
                    ___________________________ 
13 Luhmann is aware of this circumstance, as he shows when he states that since (post)modern 
(world) society "depends more on self-regulative processes than any other previous society (...) it 
cannot afford a high degree of social integration" (1982: 133). 
14 An example might be seen in the work of Marcelo Neves (1992: 182 ss., passim), when he 
identifies the lack of legitimation in Brazilian Constitutional Law for problems in its "self-
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sociological theory of law represents an attempt to escape the present "exhaustion 
of paradigm" (Abel, 1980: 826) in this field - and, by so doing it opens this 
paradigm to an unprecedented interdisciplinary dialogue.  
 
